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A
n important part of monetary policy is the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism, the process by which monetary policy actions
influence the economy. While the transmission mechanism
involves a number of channels, including exchange rates, bank credit,
and asset prices, most economists consider interest rates to be the princi-
pal avenue by which monetary policy affects economic activity. In a sim-
ple, stylized view of the interest rate channel, monetary policy first
influences bank lending rates and short-term market interest rates.
Changes in short-term rates are then transmitted to long-term rates.
Finally, economic activity responds as businesses and consumers react to
these changes in interest rates. 
The influence of monetary policy on interest rates depends importantly
on the structure of the financial system. In recent decades, significant
changes in the structure of financial markets and institutions in the United
States may have altered the interest rate channel. Key developments
include the deregulation of the financial system, the growth of capital mar-
kets as an alternative to bank intermediation, increased competition among
intermediaries both domestically and internationally, and greater trans-
parency by the Federal Reserve about monetary policy operations.
Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. is a vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City. This article is on the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org.
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These changes in the financial system may have altered both the
timing and magnitude of the response of interest rates to monetary pol-
icy. Indeed, the failure of long-term interest rates to respond to mone-
tary policy easing during the past year has been cited in the financial
press as an indication that monetary policy may now have less influence
on interest rates than in the past.
This article examines how the changing financial system has affected
the interest rate channel of monetary policy. The article finds that the
response of interest rates to monetary policy, rather than diminishing,
has actually increased considerably over time. Indeed, bank lending rates
on consumer and business loans and mortgage rates now appear to
exhibit a much stronger and faster response to monetary policy actions
than in the past. Moreover, institutional changes, such as the increased
use of variable-rate loans and the availability of low-cost mortgage refi-
nancing, may have altered the transmission mechanism, potentially
broadening the influence of monetary policy on the economy. 
The first two sections of the article describe the traditional view of
the monetary transmission mechanism and identify important changes
in the financial structure that may have altered the interest rate chan-
nel. The third section shows how the response of bank lending rates on
business and consumer loans to monetary policy actions has changed
and explores possible reasons for these changes. The fourth section
examines major developments in mortgage markets and their implica-
tions for the monetary transmission mechanism. The fifth section dis-
cusses the overall effect of the changing financial system for monetary
policy. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
I. THE INTEREST RATE CHANNEL
OF MONETARY POLICY
In the traditional view of the monetary transmission mechanism,
the banking system and interest rates play key roles in determining how
the economy responds to monetary policy.1 Changes in monetary policy
typically start in the banking system when a central bank alters the sup-
ply of bank reserves to influence a short-term interest rate. In the
United States, for example, the Federal Reserve determines a desired
level of the overnight interbank federal funds rate and maintains this
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rate by altering the supply of bank reserves. Changes in monetary pol-
icy are implemented by raising or lowering the intended federal funds
rate. These monetary policy actions are transmitted to the economy to
the extent that changes in the intended federal funds rate pass through
to other interest rates and to the extent that these interest rate changes
alter consumer and business spending. 
The process by which monetary policy actions influence interest
rates varies somewhat for different types of loans and securities. In the
case of bank loans to businesses and consumers, for example, the effects
of monetary policy are relatively straightforward. Changes in monetary
policy affect the supply of bank reserves and the cost of bank funds, and
banks tend to pass on these cost changes to loan rates. 
For market interest rates, such as those on corporate and govern-
ment securities, the transmission mechanism is more complex. One way
changes in the federal funds rate influence market interest rates is
through a process of portfolio substitution in which investors and bor-
rowers adjust their demand for and supply of securities in response to
the higher or lower federal funds rate. For example, a higher federal
funds rate raises the relative yield on short-term assets, causing investors
to shift their demand from long-term assets toward short-term assets
and borrowers to increase their supply of long-term assets. These
changes tend to lower the prices of long-term assets and raise their
yields. As a result, an increase in the federal funds rate is translated into
increases in long-term market interest rates. 
Another way monetary policy can influence market interest rates is
by influencing market expectations of future interest rates. Because long-
term interest rates depend on both current and expected future short-
term interest rates, a change in the federal funds rate will have a larger
effect on long-term rates if financial markets believe that the change will
persist for an extended period of time. Indeed, this expectation effect can
be so powerful that market interest rates move in advance of a change in
the federal funds rate if financial markets anticipate that a policy action
is likely to occur in the future (Roley and Sellon). 
The institutional structure of the banking system and financial
markets is likely to determine both the speed and the magnitude of the
response of interest rates to monetary policy actions. For example, if
banks are slow to adjust loan rates or if long-term interest rates adjust
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slowly to short-term rates, monetary policy will take longer to affect the
economy. Alternatively, if the magnitude of the response of bank lend-
ing rates and market interest rates to monetary policy actions is rela-
tively small, larger policy actions will be required to have a desired
effect on the economy.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF A
CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Because the monetary transmission mechanism depends heavily on
banks and financial markets to channel monetary policy actions through
interest rates, changes in the structure of the financial system could
alter the transmission mechanism. The past several decades have seen
major changes in the U.S. financial system that could potentially alter
the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism. These changes
can be grouped under four broad headings: financial deregulation, the
growth of capital markets, the creation of new types of financial instru-
ments, and greater transparency of monetary policy operations.
Financial deregulation
Since the 1970s, substantial deregulation of the U.S. financial sys-
tem has occurred as much of the regulatory structure put in place dur-
ing the Great Depression has been progressively dismantled. While
financial deregulation has taken many forms, two developments have
been especially important for the transmission mechanism. The first is
the removal of deposit interest-rate ceilings that began with the passage
of the Monetary Control Act of 1980. For many years, depository insti-
tution faced legal ceilings on the amount of interest that could be paid
on deposits.2 A consequence of these ceilings was that when monetary
policy was tightened, depository institutions experienced an outflow of
funds as depositors shifted funds out of these institutions in search of
higher yielding assets. Faced with an outflow of funds, depository insti-
tutions were forced to restrict credit availability. These effects fell most
heavily on thrift institutions, and so the housing market was especially
sensitive to changes in monetary policy (Duca, Kahn). 
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During the time that interest rate ceilings were in effect, the impact
of monetary policy on the housing market tended to occur more through
credit availability effects than through an interest rate channel. That is,
housing was affected more by reduced credit availability than by higher
interest rates. The principal consequence of the removal of deposit rate
ceilings is that interest rates are likely to play a greater role in allocating
credit so that the interest rate channel, especially in housing, is likely to
be a more important part of the transmission mechanism.3
Another key aspect of financial deregulation has been the removal
of geographic and product-line barriers that limit competition among
financial institutions. In the United States these changes have included
the elimination of restrictions on interstate banking and removal of
competitive barriers between banks and other financial institutions. At
the international level, many countries have taken actions to open their
financial markets to international capital flows and to foreign financial
institutions. With the removal of these restrictions, the degree of com-
petition among financial institutions has intensified. There has also been
a trend toward consolidation within industries and across financial ser-
vice industries (Group of Ten). 
These changes are likely to influence the monetary transmission
mechanism to the extent that competition and industry structure affect
the pricing of loans and other financial services. It is generally believed
that less competitive industries have more pricing power or discretion in
adjusting prices to changes in costs. If so, changes in industry structure
and the degree of competition in financial services could influence how
lending rates respond to changes in monetary policy.
Growth in capital markets
A second key development in financial markets in recent years is
the enormous growth in capital markets. This growth is reflected both
in the increased role of institutional investors, such as pension and
mutual funds, and in the greater volume of financial transactions in
these markets. One important consequence of the growing importance
of capital markets is that financial intermediation has increasingly
shifted outside of the banking system as many borrowers and investors
have switched from banks to direct finance in capital markets. For
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example, many large corporations now meet their major funding needs
through capital markets rather than bank loans, and many investors
now hold mutual funds instead of bank deposits. 
In response to these changes, many banks have altered their busi-
ness strategies. For example, banks have shifted the composition of their
lending from large corporations to smaller businesses and to consumer
and mortgage loans. In addition, banks have relied more on other
sources of income, such as fee income for payments services and risk
management products and services for investors.
These changes have important implications for the role of banks in
the transmission mechanism. Competition from capital markets, like
increased competition from other financial institutions, may influence
how banks price loans and how bank loan rates respond to monetary pol-
icy. In addition, if the composition of bank lending changes, the incidence
of monetary policy is likely to change as well. Now, as compared to a few
years ago, changes in bank loan rates are less likely to affect large corpo-
rations and more likely to influence smaller businesses and consumers.
New financial instruments
Along with the growth of capital markets has come financial inno-
vation in the form of new products designed to better meet investors’
and borrowers’ needs. Particularly noteworthy because of it implications
for the transmission mechanism is “securitization,” a process by which
individual loans are packaged together and used to back securities that
are sold to investors. The most important example of securitization is
the development of the secondary mortgage market in which individual
mortgage loans are pooled together and used to create mortgage-
backed securities. These securities are then sold to capital market
investors.4 Securitization has also occurred for other types of consumer
loans, such as credit card, automobile, and home equity loans. 
Securitization has important implications for the transmission
mechanism. The ability to securitize loans gives banks and other depos-
itory institutions access to an additional funding source so that they are
less likely to be constrained by the cost and availability of funds when
monetary policy is tightened. For example, when monetary policy is
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tightened, depository institutions can obtain additional funds by selling
loans into the secondary market and then using the funds obtained to
make additional loans. 
In addition, interest rates on loans eligible for securitization are
likely to be more closely tied to market interest rates than interest rates
on loans that cannot be securitized. For example, because mortgage-
backed securities must be priced competitively with other similar secu-
rities in capital markets, the rates on the underlying mortgage loans
must also be responsive to changes in the market interest rates on these
securities. As a result, with securitization, the influence of monetary
policy on mortgage rates may depend as much on its ability to affect
market interest rates generally as on its direct influence on the cost and
availability of funds to mortgage lenders.
A second innovation in financial markets is the growing use of vari-
able-rate loans. While some short-term business lending has been vari-
able rate for many years, variable-rate loans have become more
prominent in mortgage lending and certain types of consumer lending,
such as credit card loans and home equity lines of credit. Interest rates
on fixed-rate loans are set at the origination of the loan and remain con-
stant for the life of the loan. In contrast, for variable-rate loans, interest
rates are generally tied to an index rate so that the loan rate changes
whenever the index rate changes. For example, rates on consumer loans
that use the prime rate as an index rate will change whenever the prime
rate changes.
Variable-rate loans can influence the transmission mechanism in
two ways. First, increased use of variable-rate loans may change the
response of loan rates to monetary policy by making loan rates adjust
automatically when index rates respond to changes in monetary policy.
Second, variable-rate loans effectively create an additional channel for
interest rates to influence consumer and business spending. With a
fixed-rate loan, a borrower’s payments do not change when market
interest rates change. Thus, changes in interest rates primarily affect
new purchases that are financed by credit. For example, when rates on
fixed-rate mortgages rise, the demand for housing slows as prospective
homebuyers face higher monthly mortgage payments. In contrast, with
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a variable-rate loan, changes in interest rates alter the size of payments
on existing loans and affect the borrower’s discretionary income or cash
flow, which may influence other types of spending.
Monetary policy transparency
A fourth development that may have influenced the transmission
mechanism is a trend by central banks toward greater transparency or
openness about monetary policy. Historically, central banks have tended
to be somewhat cautious in providing information about monetary pol-
icy to financial markets, in part, because of a belief that such informa-
tion could destabilize markets.5 In recent years, however, there has been
a marked change in views spurred partly by academic research suggest-
ing that providing more information about monetary policy to financial
markets may actually help central banks achieve their long-run objec-
tives (Broaddus, Greenspan).
As a result of this change in views, the Federal Reserve now pro-
vides information about its short-run objective for the federal funds rate
and announces policy actions immediately. In the past, this information
was provided on a less timely basis and financial markets spent consid-
erable time and effort in attempting to identify policy changes. In addi-
tion, the Federal Reserve now provides a statement about the balance of
risks to the economy going forward that may help markets in assessing
the likelihood of future policy actions. 
These developments could affect the transmission mechanism by
speeding up the response of interest rates to monetary policy and reduc-
ing the length of monetary policy lags. This could happen in two ways.
First, if there are costs to adjusting loan rates and banks are uncertain
about when monetary policy actions occur, banks may be slow to
change loan rates. In this situation, more timely information about pol-
icy could speed up the adjustment of loan rates. Second, to the extent
that long-term market interest rates depend on expectations of future
policy actions, greater clarity about the longer-term objectives of mone-
tary policy could speed up the response of market interest rates as well.
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III. BANK LENDING RATES AND MONETARY POLICY
There is a considerable amount of research on the monetary trans-
mission mechanism suggesting that financial structure plays a key role
in the response of bank lending rates to monetary policy. While lending
rates have typically exhibited a sluggish response to monetary policy in
the past, changes in the financial system in recent years appear respon-
sible for a sizable increase in the response of business and consumer
lending rates to monetary policy actions.
Previous research on the responsiveness of bank lending rates
Numerous studies on the response of loan rates to monetary policy
have established two stylized facts. First, loan rates are sluggish or
sticky in responding to monetary policy actions. Second, financial struc-
ture appears important in explaining this phenomenon both within and
across countries.
The stickiness of bank loan rates has several dimensions. Loan rates
appear to be slow to adjust to policy actions, with lags ranging from
several weeks to several months. In addition, policy changes do not get
fully passed through to loan rates; that is, the response is generally less
than one-to-one. Finally, there is considerable evidence of asymmetry in
the response of loan rates. Loan rates generally react faster and more
completely when policy is tightened than when policy is eased.
Most research on the United States has focused on the behavior of
the prime rate and credit card rates. For the prime rate, there is consid-
erable evidence of long lags and asymmetry. For example, during the
1970s and early 1980s, on average the prime rate responded to mone-
tary policy changes with a lag of one to two months in periods of
increasing rates and considerably longer lags for periods of decreasing
rates (Arak, Englander, and Tang). More recent research provides addi-
tional support for slow and asymmetric adjustment of the prime rate
(Mester and Saunders, Dueker).
The stickiness of credit card interest rates is even more extreme.
Indeed, for many years credit card rates were essentially unchanged in
the face of large changes in market interest rates and other loan rates
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(Ausubel). For example, from 1972 to 1979, when the prime rate
ranged from a low of 4.75 percent to a high of 12 percent, the average
credit card rate only varied from 16.86 percent to 17.25 percent.
Similar results have been obtained in research on bank lending rates
in countries other than the United States. In many industrialized and
developing countries, bank loan rates appear to be sticky and respond
asymmetrically to monetary policy (Cottarelli and Kourelis, Borio and
Fritz, Mojon).
Economists have generally attempted to explain these results by
properties of the financial structure, including the degree of competition
in loan markets, adjustment costs faced by banks and customers, and
uncertainty about monetary policy.6 For example, in less competitive
loan markets where banks have market power, banks may have consider-
able discretion in adjusting loan rates to changes in monetary policy.
Similarly, if borrowers face large costs in shifting between lenders or if
changes in loan rates are costly for banks, loan rates may be sticky. Banks
may also be reluctant to alter loan rates until they know that monetary
policy has been changed and that the change is likely to persist.
Has the response of lending rates changed?
If the existing financial structure is an important determinant of the
behavior of loan rates, as suggested in previous research, changes in the
financial structure could alter this behavior. To determine whether the
response of bank lending rates has changed over time, this article com-
pares the behavior of rates over two separate time periods, the 1970s
and from 1994 to the present. The 1970s predate many of the impor-
tant regulatory and structural changes in financial markets that
occurred in the 1980s.7 In addition, in late 1979, the Federal Reserve
made a major change in its operating procedures that resulted in signif-
icant changes in the behavior of interest rates over the next several
years.8 In contrast, by the 1990s, many of the structural changes to
financial markets were largely complete, and the Federal Reserve had
returned to a policy of targeting the federal funds rate. Moreover, in
1994, the Federal Reserve made the first of a number of changes in its
disclosure policies that increased the transparency of monetary policy.9
Sellon.qxd  3/18/02  12:04 PM  Page 14ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2002 15
The analysis focuses on four major bank lending rates: the prime rate
and rates on credit cards, automobile loans, and personal loans. The prime
rate is a key lending rate on business loans and also serves as a benchmark
for many types of consumer lending.10 The three types of consumer loans
comprise the major forms of nonmortgage consumer finance.11
To determine whether bank lending rates have become more or less
responsive to monetary policy, the analysis focuses on two dimensions:
the speed of adjustment of lending rates and the degree of pass-
through. For the prime rate, the response of the prime rate to a measure
of the Federal Reserve’s intended federal funds rate target is exam-
ined.12 For consumer lending rates, their response to changes in the
prime rate is analyzed.13
Evidence on the speed of adjustment. One way of measuring the speed of
adjustment is to look at the behavior of the spread or the difference
between two interest rates. For example, if the prime rate adjusts only
slowly to changes in the federal funds rate target, changes in the spread
between the two rates will tend to last for an extended period of time.
That is, an increase in the funds rate target will initially narrow the
spread, and the slow response of the prime rate will cause the spread to
remain below normal for a period of time. In contrast, if the response of
the prime rate is rapid, changes in the spread will be eliminated quickly.
The spread between the prime rate and the funds rate target—both
measured weekly—is shown in Chart 1. The contrast between the 1970s
and the 1990s is striking. In the 1970s, the spread was highly cyclical,
suggesting a very slow response of the prime rate to monetary policy
actions. The response appears to have speeded up considerably beginning
in the mid-1980s causing the spread to adjust more quickly. By the mid-
1990s, the spread was essentially constant, suggesting that the response
of the prime rate to the funds rate target was almost immediate.14
There was a similar increase in the speed of adjustment of consumer
lending rates to the prime rate over the two periods (Chart 2). In the
1970s, changes in the spread between consumer lending rates and the
prime rate lasted for a considerable period of time, suggesting a very
sluggish response of consumer rates. In contrast, by the 1990s, changes
in the spread did not last as long, indicating a much faster response of
consumer rates to the prime rate.15 It is interesting to note that the
behavior of consumer lending rates appears to have changed at different
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times. Auto and personal loan rates seem to have become more respon-
sive to the prime rate in the mid-1980s, while the increased responsive-
ness of credit card rates occurred much more recently (Chart 2).
Evidence on the size of pass-through. A second dimension of the interest
rate transmission mechanism is the degree of pass-through from mone-
tary policy actions to lending rates. That is, when the federal funds rate
target changes, how large is the associated movement in lending rates?
One way of measuring pass-through is to look at the response of lend-
ing rates to changes in the funds rate target over a period of time. Chart
3 compares a measure of the degree of pass-through during periods of
monetary policy tightening in the 1970s and the 1990s.16 Pass-through
is measured as the ratio of the total change in the prime rate to the total
change in the funds rate target, or the total change in consumer lending
rates to the total change in the prime rate from the trough to the peak
in rates. The magnitude of pass-through is likely to depend on two fac-
tors: the size of the margin between the rates and the relative maturities
of the assets. Generally speaking, if banks maintain a fixed margin
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SPREAD BETWEEN PRIME RATE AND
FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGET
Sources: Board of Governors, author’s calculations
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rates and the prime, pass-through should be close to one. In addition,
other things equal, pass-through should be greater for loans of similar
maturities. Thus, the pass-through of changes in the federal funds rate
target should be smaller for loans of longer maturity.
As shown in Chart 3, changes in the federal funds rate target
appear to be fully passed through to the prime rate in both of the time
periods examined. That is, even though the speed of adjustment of the
prime rate was slower in the 1970s, the prime eventually adjusted to
maintain a roughly constant margin with the funds rate target. In con-
trast, for all three types of consumer loans, the size of pass-through was
less than one. The smaller pass-through may reflect variability in the
margins of these rates over the prime or the fact that these loans had
somewhat longer maturities than the prime.17
Although the pass-through of prime rate changes to consumer rates
is less than one-for-one, Chart 3 shows that the size of pass-through has
increased dramatically over time. For example, credit card rates essen-
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exhibited a much greater response to the prime rate in the 1990s. Sim-
ilarly, the pass-through on auto loan rates rose from about 20 percent to
75 percent over the two periods.
Explanations for the increased response of bank lending rates
Structural changes in the financial system and in the implementa-
tion of monetary policy appear largely responsible for the significant
increase in the response of bank lending rates to monetary policy. In the
case of the prime rate, one likely factor is the increased competition for
business loans among banks and between banks and nonbank financial
intermediaries discussed earlier. 
Another factor is the greater transparency of monetary policy. In
the 1970s, Federal Reserve policy actions were rarely announced.18
While financial markets could often discern policy changes within a few
days or a week, official confirmation of a policy action generally did not
occur until the next FOMC meeting several weeks later. In contrast,












RESPONSE OF CONSUMER LOAN RATES AND PRIME RATE
TO MONETARY TIGHTENING
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changes on the day of the decision. Thus, greater certainty about when
policy actions occur may have increased the speed of response of the
prime rate.
A second way that policy transparency may have led to a faster
response of the prime is by altering the relationship between monetary
policy and the cost of bank funds. Previous research on the prime rate
has identified changes in the cost of funds as an important determinant
of a bank’s decision on when to change the prime rate (Forbes and
Mayne, Goldberg). One measure of the cost of funds is the rate that
banks pay on large denomination certificates of deposits. In the 1970s,
changes in CD rates typically occurred at the same time as a monetary
policy action or shortly thereafter. In contrast, in recent years CD rates,
like many other market interest rates, appear to have moved in advance
of policy actions. Consequently, banks may now experience significant
cost pressures before rather than after policy actions. If so, banks may
be under increased pressure to speed up the response of the prime rate,
and an announced policy action may now serve as the trigger for prime
rate changes.
The increased responsiveness of bank automobile loan rates is likely
due to two structural changes. One is the greater degree of competition
from automobile finance companies, such as General Motors Accep-
tance Corporation and Ford Motor Credit. These companies generally
finance their lending by selling short-term commercial paper so that the
rate they charge on auto loans varies with market interest rates. To
compete with these lenders, banks may be forced to adjust rates on new
auto loans in line with finance company and market rates. An addi-
tional development is the securitization of automobile loans, which
began in the mid-1980s. As noted earlier, securitization of loans tends
to force interest rates on the loans to move in line with market interest
rates, so the growth in securitization of auto loans may have increased
their responsiveness to the prime rate as well.
Two factors appear to be behind the increased responsiveness of per-
sonal loans and credit card loans. One development is a shift from fixed-
rate to variable-rate loans. Many variable-rate loans are tied to an index
rate such as the prime rate so that the loan rate changes whenever the
index rate changes. Thus, a faster response of the prime rate to mone-
tary policy would translate into a faster response of interest rates on
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variable-rate loans. In addition, to the extent that the margin between
the loan rate and the index rate is fixed, changes in the index rate would
tend to be fully passed through to the loan rate. Consequently, if vari-
able-rate loans make up an increasing share of total loans, the amount
of pass-through may increase.
Variable-rate loans appear to have become prominent in the market
for personal loans during the 1980s (Stango). The use of variable-rate
loans for credit cards is much more recent and appears to be associated
with increased competition among credit card issuers over the past few
years (Stango, Board of Governors 1999). For example, in 1990, only
about 5 percent of credit card loans were variable rate. By 1994, the
percentage of variable-rate loans had increased to 57 percent and, by
2000, to 75 percent (Stango, Nilson Report).
Another factor behind the increased responsiveness of credit card
rates is the trend toward securitization, which began in the mid-1980s.
Credit card issuers can issue securities backed by credit card loans and
sell these securities in capital markets to obtain new funds to make
additional credit card loans. As in the case of auto loans, securitization
tends to force interest rates on the underlying loans to move in line with
market rates so that the card-backed securities can remain competitive
with other securities. Thus, the growth of credit card securitization may
also have contributed to increased flexibility of interest rates on credit
card loans.
IV. MORTGAGE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY
While changes in the financial system have had significant effects
on bank lending rates, the implications for mortgage markets have been
even more profound. Deregulation and securitization have fundamen-
tally altered the structure of housing finance. As a result, mortgage
rates, like bank lending rates, have become more responsive to mone-
tary policy, and the monetary transmission mechanism has been altered
as well.
Sellon.qxd  3/18/02  12:04 PM  Page 20ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2002 21
Traditional structure of housing finance
Historically, housing finance in the United States relied heavily on
specialized mortgage lenders, such as saving and loan associations and
mutual savings banks, rather than on commercial banks to finance home
mortgages. Consequently, mortgage rates were determined in a very dif-
ferent institutional framework than lending rates on consumer and busi-
ness loans. Mortgage markets tended to be local in nature with local
deposits used to fund local mortgages. These features had both positive
and negative implications for housing finance. On the one hand, local
mortgage markets tended to be somewhat insulated from national credit
conditions. On the other hand, there was not a good mechanism for
directing deposit flows to areas of high mortgage demand.
Regulation, in the form of interest rate ceilings on deposits, also
played a key role in housing finance. Commercial banks had been sub-
ject to deposit rate ceilings since the 1930s and similar regulations were
extended to thrift institutions in the 1960s. During periods of tight
monetary policy, deposit rate ceilings caused a sharp outflow of funds
from mortgage lenders, which limited their ability to make new mort-
gage loans. Deposit rate ceilings helped make local mortgage markets
more responsive to national credit conditions and monetary policy. In
addition, when these ceilings became binding during periods of tight
monetary policy, thrift institutions tended to ration credit by restricting
its availability rather than by raising mortgage rates.
As a result of these structural features of housing finance, mortgage
rates, like bank lending rates, tended to respond very sluggishly to
changes in monetary policy. For example, during the mid-1970s mort-
gage rates lagged significantly behind the federal funds rate and the
market rate on 10-year Treasury notes (Chart 4). The lagged response of
mortgage rates is apparent both for periods when policy was tightened
and for periods when policy was eased. Indeed, the behavior of short-
term and long-term interest rates shown in this chart is very consistent
with the traditional view of the interest rate channel of monetary policy
described earlier in this article in which monetary policy actions precede
movements in market interest rates.
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Changes in the structure of housing finance
The traditional structure of housing finance was undermined by the
inflationary environment of the late 1970s. As inflation and nominal
interest rates rose, thrift institutions were caught in a severe profit
squeeze. The cost of funds rose dramatically and deposits flowed out of
thrift institutions. At the same time, income from mortgage loans did
not increase because thrift institutions were restricted to making long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages.
These problems led to a significant deregulation of mortgage mar-
kets in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One important change was the
elimination of deposit-rate ceilings, which were phased out over a period
of time. A second change was the legalization of variable or adjustable-
rate mortgages. While both of these changes were primarily designed to
aid thrift institutions, they had much broader implications for the mone-
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An even more radical change in housing finance occurred with the
securitization of mortgage loans. The securitization of mortgage loans
first began in the early 1970s, and the secondary mortgage market
expanded rapidly in the early 1980s. Securitization affected housing
finance in two important ways. First, the securitization of mortgage
loans caused mortgage markets to be directly linked to capital markets.
As a result, funding of mortgage loans became national in scope rather
than local, and local mortgage rates became more responsive to capital
market rates, as was the case for credit card, auto, and other securitized
loans. Second, securitization resulted in a transformation of the mort-
gage lending process that greatly increased competition in the origina-
tion of mortgage loans.19 The increased competition, coupled with cost
reductions brought about by automation, caused a significant drop in
the cost of obtaining a mortgage and made mortgage refinancing a new
and important element in housing finance.
Implications for mortgage rates and the transmission mechanism
The expected effect of these structural changes in housing finance is
an increase in the responsiveness of mortgage rates to monetary policy. In
particular, the removal of deposit rate ceilings places less of the burden of
rationing available housing credit on quantitative restrictions and more
on mortgage rates. Thus, mortgage rates would be expected to move
more in response to a tightening or easing of monetary policy than in the
era of deposit rate ceilings. Similarly, the securitization of mortgage loans
should tie mortgage rates more closely to market interest rates. 
Indeed, there has been a remarkable change in the behavior of
mortgage rates in recent years. As was the case for bank lending rates,
the pass-through of monetary policy actions to mortgage rates appears
to have increased. For example, the pass-through of a change in the fed-
eral funds target to mortgage rates was much larger in the 1994-95 and
1999-2000 episodes of monetary tightening than in periods of tighten-
ing during the 1970s (Chart 5).20
In addition, mortgage rates now appear much more responsive to
market rates. Movements in rates on fixed-rate mortgages are now
closely synchronized with capital market rates, such as the rate on 10-
year Treasury securities (Chart 6). Perhaps most interesting is the timing
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of the response of mortgage rates to monetary policy actions. As shown
in Chart 4, mortgage rates used to follow monetary policy actions with
a considerable lag. More recently, however, both mortgage rates and
market interest rates appear to anticipate monetary policy actions
(Chart 6).21 In both the 1994-95 and 1999-2000 episodes of monetary
tightening, mortgage rates rose somewhat in advance of increases in the
federal funds rate target and fell substantially before decreases in the
funds rate target. 
The transmission mechanism has also been affected by the intro-
duction of variable-rate mortgage loans and by the lower cost of mort-
gage refinancing. Variable-rate loans have two effects on the
transmission mechanism. First, they tend to cushion the effects of
tighter monetary policy. Most variable-rate loans use a short-term inter-
est rate as the index for the loan. The mortgage rate is set at a fixed
margin above the index rate and changes, generally on an annual basis,
when the index rate changes. Because short-term interest rates are typ-
ically below long-term rates, homebuyers can get a lower interest rate
by choosing a variable-rate loan rather than a fixed-rate loan when
interest rates are rising. As shown in Chart 7, at the onset of monetary
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PASS-THROUGH OF MONETARY POLICY TIGHTENING
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average of rates on fixed and variable-rate mortgages, weighted by the
proportions of fixed and variable-rate loans, increased by less than the
increase in the rate on fixed-rate loans. Consequently, the existence of
variable-rate loans tends to temper the effect of higher mortgage rates
on the housing market.
A second implication of variable-rate mortgages is potentially more
significant. Monthly payments on a variable-rate loan change whenever
the index rate resets. Because of the size of mortgage loans, even a rela-
tively small change in the rate can cause a large change in the monthly
payment.22 As a result, when a change in monetary policy causes the
index rate to change, the increase or decrease in monthly payments
alters discretionary income and may lead to changes in consumer spend-
ing. Thus, with variable-rate mortgage loans, there is an additional
channel through which monetary policy can influence consumer spend-
ing beyond the traditional effect on housing demand through changes
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RELATIONSHIP OF INTEREST RATES DURING THE 1990S
Source: Board of Governors
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The existence of low-cost mortgage refinancing also has implica-
tions for the transmission mechanism. When mortgage rates fall as
monetary policy is eased, homeowners with fixed-rate loans may refi-
nance these loans either to lower monthly payments or to take cash out
based on the home’s equity.24 Refinancing rises sharply in periods in
which mortgage rates are falling and drops off quickly when rates begin
to increase (Chart 8). Since the mid-1980s, refinancing has become an
important part of housing finance with refinancing accounting for as
much as three-quarters of new loans in periods of lower interest rates.
Because of refinancing, an easing of monetary policy may increase
household discretionary income in a manner similar to that of a variable-
rate loan. Consequently, when monetary policy is eased, the traditional
effect of lower mortgage rates on the demand for new homes may be
supplemented by additional discretionary income for existing homeown-






2000 1995 1990 1985
Interest rate




VARIABLE-RATE MORTGAGES CUSHION EFFECTS
OF TIGHTER POLICY
Sources: Board of Governors, author’s calculations
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V. THE CHANGING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
AND MONETARY POLICY
Changes in the U.S. financial system over the past two decades have
had important effects on the monetary transmission mechanism. While,
on balance, these changes appear to have strengthened the interest rate
channel of monetary policy, they also raise some fundamental new ques-
tions about the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Implications for the interest rate channel
Changes in the financial structure appear to have influenced the
interest rate channel in three ways. First, there has been a striking
increase in the size of the response of interest rates to monetary policy
for bank lending rates on business and consumer loans and for mort-
gage rates. This change suggests that a given change in the federal
funds rate target will have a larger effect on these rates or, equivalently,
that a smaller change in the federal funds rate target may be required to
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Second, there is also evidence of much faster response of interest
rates to monetary policy actions. This change is perhaps most apparent
in the case of mortgage rates, which now appear to anticipate policy
actions by weeks or even months instead of lagging behind policy
actions. In addition, the prime rate has reacted almost immediately to
policy changes in recent years instead of lagging several weeks behind.
These changes suggest that the length of monetary policy lags may
have been shortened considerably. 
Third, the increased use of variable-rate loans and lower costs of
mortgage refinancing have potentially broadened the scope of the inter-
est rate channel. When monetary policy is tightened or eased, changes
in rates on variable rate loans alter loan payments and discretionary
income. Thus, in addition to the traditional effect of interest rates on
the demand for new loans, monetary policy may influence other types of
spending by altering payments on variable-rate loans. The availability
of low-cost mortgage refinancing has a similar effect. As a decline in
mortgage rates leads to an increase in refinancing, homeowners may use
the money saved via lower payments or equity extraction to finance
other purchases. 
At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that vari-
able-rate loans and refinancing introduce some asymmetries into the
transmission mechanism. The potential spending stimulus from refi-
nancing only occurs on a large scale when mortgage rates are falling
and when rates fall by enough to make refinancing profitable. Further-
more, the existence of variable-rate loans gives new homebuyers an
alternative to higher-cost, fixed-rate loans when interest rates are rising.
Consequently, to the extent that homebuyers can substitute between
the two types of loans, the availability of variable-rate loans may serve
to cushion the effects of tighter monetary policy.
Although some of these effects are difficult to quantify, on balance,
they appear to have strengthened the interest rate channel either by
increasing the influence of monetary policy on interest rates or by
broadening the effect of interest rate changes on the economy.25
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How does monetary policy influence interest rates?
These changes in the structure of the U.S. financial system also have
some broader implications for the monetary transmission mechanism.
In the traditional view of the transmission mechanism described earlier,
there is an implicit tendency to view interest rates as reacting to mone-
tary policy actions. This view appears to adequately characterize the
relationship between policy actions and bank lending rates both in the
period before changes in the U.S. financial structure and more recently. 
As the role of capital markets has grown, however, the traditional
view seems increasingly at odds with the relationship between market
interest rates and policy actions. Indeed, evidence that market interest
rates and mortgage rates frequently anticipate monetary policy actions
suggests the need for a conceptual change in thinking about the interest
rate channel. Market interest rates increasingly appear to react to news
on the economy based on an assumption as to how the Federal Reserve
is likely to respond to this news in future policy actions. In this environ-
ment, rather than viewing monetary policy actions as initiating or caus-
ing changes in market interest rates, it may be better to view monetary
policy actions as affecting market interest rates by confirming or refut-
ing market expectations about future policy actions.26
One implication of this different perspective is that it may be very
misleading to attempt to date changes in monetary policy by looking
only at announced changes in policy targets, since some of the change in
policy may be incorporated in market rates well before the date of the
policy action. Thus, in this view, the failure of long-term rates to respond
to monetary policy actions during the past year should not be too sur-
prising because much of the decline in rates occurred considerably before
the Federal Reserve began to lower the federal funds rate target. 
A second implication of this perspective is that that the effective-
ness of monetary policy in altering market interest rates may vary over
the course of a tightening or easing cycle. For example, early in a cycle,
financial markets may build a series of expected policy actions into
interest rates so that an announced policy action may be associated with
a rather large change in longer-term market interest rates. In contrast,
later in the cycle, markets may believe that current policy actions are
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likely to be reversed relatively soon. If so, longer-term market rates may
appear unresponsive to monetary policy actions or even move in the
opposite direction from what might normally be expected.
A third and final implication of the growing importance of capital
markets is that it is very important for financial markets and central
banks to be on the same wavelength.27 If they are not, markets interest
rates may experience unnecessary volatility. For example, if financial mar-
kets believe that a policy change is forthcoming, interest rates will tend to
move before the expected policy action. If markets are wrong and a policy
action does not materialize as expected, financial markets will tend to
unwind some of the expected policy actions, and interest rates will reverse
some or all of their prior movement. The result is unnecessary volatility of
interest rates that could be reduced or avoided if financial markets have a
better understanding of the monetary policy process.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Interest rates play a key role in the way that monetary policy influ-
ences the economy. Over the past three decades, major changes in the
U.S. financial system—including deregulation, the growth of capital
markets, the development of new financial instruments, and greater
transparency of monetary policy—appear to have altered the interest
rate channel of monetary policy. As a result, in recent years monetary
policy actions have been associated with a faster and larger response of
bank lending rates on consumer and business loans and mortgage rates.
Moreover, institutional changes, such as the increased importance of
variable-rate loans and mortgage refinancing, suggest that interest rate
changes may now have broader effects on economic activity. 
While an overall assessment of the importance of these develop-
ments is difficult to make, on balance, changes in the financial structure
appear to have strengthened the interest rate channel of monetary pol-
icy. At the same time, these changes in the U.S. financial system suggest
a need to modernize the traditional view of the monetary transmission
to reflect the fact that monetary policy now works through capital mar-
kets as well as through the banking system.
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ENDNOTES
1 For a more comprehensive discussion of the transmission mechanism includ-
ing channels other than interest rates, see the articles in the “Symposia on the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism” in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1995,
vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 3-96.
2 Commercial banks were subject to deposit rate ceilings under the Federal
Reserve’s Regulation Q beginning in the 1930s. Deposit rate ceilings were
extended to thrift institutions in the mid-1960s.
3 It is important to note that the overall impact of monetary policy on hous-
ing could be smaller after deregulation if the reduction in credit rationing was
quantitatively larger than the increased role of interest rates.
4 For a discussion of the securitization of housing finance, see Sellon and Van-
Nahmen.
5 For a detailed discussion of central bank secrecy and policy transparency, see
Goodfriend.
6 For summaries of explanations that have been offered for the stickiness of
bank-lending rates, see Cottarelli and Kourelis and Nabor, Park, and Saunders.
7 Major regulatory changes occurred with the Monetary Control Act of 1980
and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. In addition, developments such as securi-
tization and the use of variable rate lending became more prominent in the 1980s.
8 The Federal Reserve switched from the use of a federal funds rate-operating
target to a nonborrowed reserve target, a change that was associated with sharply
increased interest rate volatility.
9 The Federal Reserve began immediate announcement of changes in the
intended federal funds rate in February 1994 and provided its assessment of risks
to the outlook beginning in May 1999.
10 The role of the prime rate has evolved significantly over the years. Once
viewed as the rate charged to a bank’s best corporate customers, the prime now
serves primarily as a base rate for smaller business loans and for many consumer
loans. Recently, for example, the prime was used as the base rate for about 22 per-
cent of new business lending by commercial banks and was the most common base
rate for loans under $1 million (Board of Governors 2001). Many variable rate
consumer loans, such as credit card and home equity lines of credit, are frequently
tied to the prime.
11 These rates are obtained from a quarterly survey by the Board of Gover-
nors. The rates reported are the most common rate charged during the first calen-
dar week of the middle month of each quarter.
12 For the 1970s, the target series used is an unofficial measure constructed by
Rudebusch and by Sellon. For the 1990s, the intended federal funds rate is avail-
able from the Board of Governors.
13 This article does not look directly at the response of consumer rates to the
federal funds rate target because of data limitations. The consumer lending rates
are measured quarterly and are only available since 1972. The federal funds rate
target series is only available from late 1974. In contrast, the prime rate is available
throughout the period.
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14 These findings are confirmed by results from estimating an error correction
model for the prime and the funds rate target for the two periods: January 1975 to
October 1979, and January 1994 to September 2001. In the early period, the
speed of adjustment is about 13 percent per week, suggesting that the prime took
about eight weeks to fully respond to a target change. In the more recent period,
the initial response is 70 percent, indicating that the entire adjustment takes place
by the following week. Moreover, these results may understate the speed of
response in the more recent period because the rates are measured on a week-
ended Wednesday basis. Since target changes are generally made at FOMC meet-
ings that occur on Tuesday or Wednesday, even a one or two-day lag in the
adjustment of the prime will be measured as occurring in the following week.
15 Econometric estimates also suggest a much faster speed of response for all
three types of consumer loan rates to the prime rate. For example, the response of
auto loan rates to the prime appears to have increased from about 14 percent per
quarter to 64 percent per quarter. However, because of the limited number of
observations available in the two samples, less confidence can be attached to these
estimates than to the relationship between the prime and the funds rate target.
16 The response for the 1970s is the average of two tightening cycles in 1972-
74 and 1977-October 1979. The response for the 1990s is the average of two
tightening cycles in 1994-95 and 1999-2000.
17 The maturity for the loan data used in this article is 24 months for personal
loans and 48 months for auto loans.
18 Generally, the Federal Reserve did not immediately announce policy actions
except in situations in which the discount rate was changed.
19 Prior to securitization, mortgage lenders would originate loans to be held in
their investment portfolio until maturity. Securitization led to the unbundling of
the mortgage process into its component parts: origination, portfolio investment,
and servicing, with each activity potentially done by a different institution.
Because of low scale-economies, loan-origination has become extremely competi-
tive and origination fees have fallen dramatically. Todd provides evidence of the
impact of securitization on mortgage origination costs.
20 Pass-through is measured as the ratio of the change in mortgage rates from
trough to peak to the corresponding change in the federal funds rate target.
21 Lange, Sack, and Whitesell provide evidence that the ability of market
rates to anticipate policy actions has increased in recent years.
22 For example, on a loan of $ 150,000, a decline in the loan rate from 8 per-
cent to 7 percent reduces the monthly payment by $ 102.55, resulting in an
increase in discretionary income of about $ 1,200 for the year. For comparison, this
amount is twice the size of the 2001 income tax rebate for families.
23 This effect is attenuated by two factors. Many variable-rate loans have lim-
its on the amount by which the mortgage rate can adjust at one time and over the
life of the loan. In addition, if the rate resets annually, only a fraction of variable-
rate loans will have their rates reset at any one time. Clearly, the effect will be
larger the longer the change in the index rate persists as more loans become sub-
ject to a new rate.
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24 The relationship between mortgage rates and the level of refinancing activ-
ity is difficult to predict. For a homeowner, whether refinancing is profitable
depends on how much the current mortgage rate is below the rate on the existing
loan, the cost of the refinancing, and the likely tenure in the home.
25 It is also important to recognize that while these developments appear to
have been strengthened the interest rate channel, there may have been offsetting
changes elsewhere that have reduced the impact of monetary policy on the econ-
omy. For example, there may have been changes in other channels of monetary
policy. Alternatively, the interest sensitivity of some sectors of the economy may
have been reduced. These considerations are beyond the scope of this article.
26 A more extreme view is that in this new environment central banks can
move market interest rates purely by policy statements, without any associated
policy actions (Guthrie and Wright).
27 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Poole.
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